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 Power planning in fragile and
conflict-affected states
Traditional methods of energy planning are likely to provide
results that may be inappropriate in fragile and conflict-affected
countries. The risks of violence and damage, significant delays
and cancellations in infrastructure projects, or projects coming
in at very high cost, are rife in these states. Security issues can
significantly hamper, or make infeasible, the delivery of power
system plans.
We look at how traditional power system planning and
expansion models could be augmented to better consider the
deep uncertainty associated with development in fragile
contexts. We find that resilience aspects, combined with
modular and incremental benefits of distributed generation
technologies and systems, emerge as attractive options if the
various risks of infrastructure development are included in
modelling techniques. Investing in a diverse mix of supply types
in the medium term and building a power system with
redundancies or a higher share of local resources in the long
term, is an effective approach to reduce vulnerability to conflict
and socio-political fragility.
Traditional least-cost planning yields an investment plan that makes
perfect technical and economic sense if these projects could be
financed, developed in a timely manner, and operated in a
conventional way. However, this is generally not the case in fragile
states.
Almost all widely-used energy planning models overlook socio-
political aspects, including political instability. Least-cost planning
methodologies tend toward the economies of scale offered by large-
scale, centralised systems and do not consider the uncertainty that
abounds in fragile contexts, including the risk of large-scale projects
not being eventuated, or delayed, damaged or destroyed. The
viability of large-scale, centralised infrastructure is also inherently
dependent on functioning systems and institutions, as well as some
level of political and social stability – factors that are often absent in
fragile contexts.
Considerations for power-planning in fragile states
Any delay in even a single large project can have far-reaching
impacts on the business environment and economic growth of very
undeveloped countries. Even if the project is successfully financed
and developed on time, the operational risk stemming from either
extensive damage to the power station or the transmission lines/sub-
stations could lead to a collapse of the entire grid.
Taking the stance that investments in large projects should just be
postponed until conflict risk is lower is not viable in fragile states. It
may take many years to reach a place of adequate stability, and this
approach overlooks the key role that energy access plays in kick-
starting economic activities needed to create jobs and income-
generation opportunities, which are vital to achieving greater social
stability – and to moving a country out of fragility.
Conflict affects power system-planning in many ways, and some
dynamics to consider in conflict areas include:
Forced outages increase during times of conflict – power system
assets, especially transmission lines, are frequent targets of attack.
Repair times tend to increase because of labour shortages, site access
problems, and unavailability of imported spare parts. Inadequate
maintenance of equipment during conflict could also lead to higher
malfunction rates.
Fuel shortages are common in conflict zones – including as a result
of deliberate attacks on fuel supply lines, disruption of imports and
transportation infrastructure, and shortages of labour.
Cost changes during conflict – due to currency exchange rates
appreciating or depreciating, unforeseen repair and replacement costs,
and extra security measures.
Construction time is frequently prolonged during conflict – due to
problems of importing equipment or recruiting workers, site access,
sabotage, and temporary or permanent suspension of funding.
New approaches are needed for fragile states
New methods that explicitly recognise and internalise the risks
inherent in fragile contexts and integrate them into planning tools are
necessary to allow consideration of alternative, more flexible, and
incremental options. Prioritising resiliency in the face of severe
insecurity might result in very different optimal infrastructure
outcomes in fragile contexts.
Some key elements of the new thinking needed for fragile states
include:
Robust decision-making techniques that enable planners to explore
strategies that perform equally well across a large range of plausible
futures, offer much value. Stand-alone systems, like mini-grids, are
particularly useful in this regard as they have the benefit of being able
to be engineered to be compatible with the grid if or when it arrives.
Solutions that are modular, flexible, less capital-intensive and
easier/quicker to build and manage offer useful attributes in
conflict-prone areas. For instance, in a particular scenario, building a
large hydro plant may well be the least-cost option under certainty and
perfect foresight. However, if we start to factor in the quantatitve
impact of the risks that the project may be delayed or cancelled or
damaged, or the higher operation and maintenance costs that large-
scale projects involve, the risk-adjusted levelised cost may start rising
quickly to a point where more distributed choices, including mini-
grids, may work out to be cheaper.
Distributed generation technologies are also more resilient to risk.
Distributed systems not only spatially distribute the physical
hardware, but also the risk of failure. By contrast, large facilities that
benefit from economies of scale are also vulnerable to attack and
concentrate risk over a much smaller spatial domain. In looking at this
issue, Zeriffi et al. (2002) find that, when comparing an electricity
system based on distributed natural-gas-fired units to a traditional
system based on a large, centralised plant, the distributed system
proves to be up to five times less sensitive to measures of systemic
attack.
Conflict intensity and location changes over time and approaches
must have adaptive strategies that collect data concerning conflict
risks, acknowledge improvement or deterioration in conditions in
all/part of the country, and adjust management decisions accordingly.
Distributed generation has further advantages in conflict areas,
including an increased number of smaller-sized generators, decreased
reliance on centralised transmission and distribution, real-time
operational advantages, fuel flexibility, and increased fuel storage
options.
How can we better model power-planning in fragile contexts?
Can we modify existing least-cost planning tools? Or do the
situations in fragile states necessitate a fundamentally new
approach? Unfortunately, there is no established methodology to
capture the risks associated with fragility and conflict in power-
planning, much less a uniformly agreed model. However, there are
different ways to think about incorporating fragility risk into
planning models (note, these are not mutually exclusive):
Least-cost planning models with tailored inputs, whereby a
conscious intervention is made through the choice of model inputs.
This could include introducing factors such as higher interest rates,
lower available capital, modalities of finance (especially debt vs.
equity finance and public vs. private funding), prolonged construction
time, and damage cost over the entire planning horizon.
Purpose-made models for fragile contexts, based on models of
decision-making under uncertainty. These would explicitly capture the
flexibility or ‘option’ value of some of the modular generation and
transmission investments. For example, a large number of mini-grids
may be more expensive than a single central solar PV plant, but offer
significantly higher flexibility to mobilise financing and develop these
on an ‘as needed’ basis. If they are backward compatible, i.e. can be
hooked into the main grid if and when the grid arrives, the option
value of these investments increases greatly.
Having temporal, technological and geographical resolution to
models that allow planners to assess relative vulnerability to conflict
effects of investments pursued in different years, technologies, and
locations. This could guide the following courses of action:
Planners can wait for some of the conflict uncertainty to be
resolved, deferring certain investments.
Planners can diversify or change the technological/geographical
composition of the investment plan.
Planners can adjust capacity levels (for example, install redundant
capacity as back-ups).
Incorporating sensitivity analysis into models. This is needed to
bring in crucial information on conflict impact and consider actions
that might mitigate the impact of the uncertainty; for example,
adoption of emergency response practices to reduce vulnerability or
repair times.
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